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The major unresolved issues in the negotiations 
on the UNCTAD code of conduct for the 
transfer of technology 
Miguel S. Wionczek* 
Ten years after the appearance on the inter-
national agenda of the issue of technology 
transfer, a consensus seems to be emerging 
among the parties concerned —both technolo-
gy suppliers and technology importers— that: 
(a) technological know-how, including its 
development and transfer, is one of the key 
factors in the economic growth and social 
development of all countries; 
(b) the technology transfer process invol-
ves a complex blend of capital, know-how, and 
trained personnel, and 
(c) the successful selection, adaptation, 
utilization and innovation of technology re-
quires a certain level of technological capabili-
ty within a given country. 
This sort of agreement in principle on the 
centre points of the issue of less developed 
country (LDC) participation in world tech-
nological advancement points to considerable 
progress towards understanding by the ad-
vanced countries of the reasons for the LDCs' 
long-standing insistence on the need to regu-
late international technology trade. Unfortu-
nately, however, the deadlock reached at the 
United Nations Conference on a Code of 
Conduct for the Transfer of Technology, which 
adjourned in Geneva after three meetings last 
February without having been able to reach 
final agreement regarding such a Code, indi-
cated once again that a consensus on broad 
principles is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for agreeing on international policy 
measures and their implementation. Moreover, 
the general economic stagnation and the 
growing competition for international markets 
among the major industrial powers has been 
reviving lately the opposition in some ad-
vanced countries against the liberalization of 
technology flows to the LDCs and the estab-
lishment of international "'rules of the game" 
for technology transactions.1 
II 
In view of the present adverse conditions it 
may be useful to restate once again the LDC 
case for a multinational code of conduct for the 
transfer of technology. Not only was the initia-
tive in that respect taken by the LDCs, but over 
five years have now been spent in international 
meetings on clarifying misunderstandings 
around that issue, considered to be of great 
importance for a new international economic 
order. 
Because they have been dependent his-
"Senior Research Associate, El Colegio de México. 
torically to a decisive degree on imports of 
technical know-how, the LDCs saw ahead of 
the rest of the world the need to establish a set 
of mutually acceptable rules for worldwide 
technology trade and to link international 
technological transactions with their own de-
velopment needs. The LDCs were innovators 
in that field precisely because, as technology 
importers, they realize better than others the 
^ o r more details see M. S. Wionczek, "Science and 
Technology for Development", The Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists (Chicago), Vol. 35, No. 4, April 1979, pp. 45-48. 
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complexity of technology transfer, the econo-
mic disadvantages of traditional technology 
packages incorporated unilaterally into foreign 
private investment projects, and the crucial 
importance of domestic technological capabili-
ty for the success of technology imports. They 
realize furthermore that this domestic capabili-
ty neither comes automatically with commer-
cial technology transfers nor can be imported 
lock, stock and barrel. 
If one remembers that the LDCs acted as 
the initiators of the present worldwide debate 
on the subject of technology transfer and its 
regulation, then their arguments as regards the 
particular form of such regulation cannot be 
disposed of lightly as stemming either from 
ignorance or radical delusions. 
All initial proposals for the regulation of 
international technology trade, made by a large 
group of the more advanced LDCs at UNCTAD 
and elsewhere in the 1970-1975 period, have 
met with strong opposition on a number of 
grounds from the major Western technology-
exporting countries. The LDCs were told on 
innumerable occasions during that period that 
technology, being an undefined and very com-
plicated object of international transactions, 
did not lend itself to international regulation; 
that technology, being mostly private property, 
could not be subject to such regulation; and, 
The quasi-metaphysical discussions about the 
feasibility and possibility of regulating interna-
tional technology trade gave place to a more 
practical and pragmatic debate only in May 
1975 at UNCTAD in Geneva, when the LDCs 
presented the Western industrial countries and 
the European socialist bloc with a detailed 
draft of the possible contents of an international 
Code of Conduct on technology transfer. This 
first draft outline of international regulatory 
measures in the field of technology trade, 
prepared by experts from some 40 LDCs, 
injected real life into the intergovernmental 
political and technical discussions on tech-
nological advancement, technology transfer 
and industrial property systems. 
finally, that any attempt to regulate interna-
tional technology trade would have negative 
effects on technology flows.2 The LDCs were 
warned that such regulation would scare tech-
nology sellers from entering into contracts with 
relatively small, uncertain, and underdevel-
oped markets in countries supposedly only too 
eager to impose technology restrictions for the 
restrictions' sake. 
By now, we all know that these general 
objections against the regulation of technology 
transfer do not stand up to any serious criticism. 
If technology and technology transfer could not 
be defined and identified, we would scarcely 
have seen the emergence of an international 
patent system more than 100 years ago, a 
system aptly called a private system of tech-
nology trade control by an outstanding United 
States expert on international law, Prof. C. 
Fatouros of the University of Georgia.3 If 
transactions involving private property could 
not be subject to international regulation, there 
would be no room for such multilateral arrange-
ments as GATT. If the absence of regulation 
were a precondition for the international ex-
change of goods and services, there would have 
been no such thing as East-West trade, which 
apparently is advantageous to all the parties 
involved. 
The objective of the draft outline of a Code 
prepared by the LDCs in 1976 was not to 
impose its contents unconditionally upon tech-
nology producers and exporters, but only to 
prove that international regulation of technolo-
gy trade was both possible and feasible and that 
This last argument, based upon partial and biased 
evidence, continues to be propagated under the guise oí 
"scientific surveys" by commercial firms selling advice to 
large international business firms. For details see, for 
example, Business International, S.A., Transfer of Tech-
nology — A Survey of Corporate Reactions to a Proposed 
Code, Geneva, April 1978. 
See the background papers for the International 
Conference on Technology Transfer Control Systems 
(Phase II), Seattle, 6-7 April 1979. 
Il l 
THE MAJOR UNRESOLVED ISSUES... ¡Miguel Wionczek 97 
it was urgent to start meaningful negotiations 
on the subject. This objective was achieved. In 
answer to the LDCs draft the Western indus-
trial countries presented counter-proposals 
covering all major subject areas included in the 
LDC proposals. It is common knowledge that 
the outline Code offered by the Western coun-
tries borrowed heavily in many substantive 
points from the LDCs draft. 
Moreover, in late 1976 the European so-
cialist countries, which are heavy importers of 
technology, decided to join actively in the 
exercise by offering their own sektchy outline 
of a Code. The subsequent socialist drafts, 
submitted in 1977-1978, covered all major 
Code issues in technical language comparable 
to that used in the LDC and Western proposals. 
Finally, China joined the UNCTAD negotia-
tions in February 1978, supporting in general 
terms the LDC position. 
North-South technological co-operation, 
technology transfer and the Code of Conduct 
were perhaps the only subject on which 
UNCTAD IV (Nairobi, May 1976) was able to 
reach a substantial degree of agreement by 
consensus. This Conference recommended 
that: 
1. The drafting of a single set of proposals 
for an international Code of Conduct for tech-
nology transfer should be accelerated with a 
view to its completion by the end of 1977; 
2. The experts drafting the tentative com-
posite text of the proposed Code should be free 
to formulate draft provisions ranging from 
mandatory to optional, without prejudice to the 
final decision on the legal character of the Code 
of Conduct, and 
3. After the drafting of the proposed Code 
was completed, the United Nations should 
convene in 1978 an international negotiating 
conference for the purpose of drafting the final 
document as well as "taking all other decisions 
necessary for its adoption". 
IV 
Subsequentíy, six UNCTAD expert meetings 
at governmental level were held and an 
UNCTAD Conference on the Code of Conduct 
opened in the fall of 1978. By the time the third 
session of the Conference adjourned in Fe-
bruary 1979, considerable progress had been 
made toward a single text of a possible conven-
tion on what the LDCs call a code of conduct 
and the Western industrial countries a "volun-
tary code", that would apply universally to all 
technology transactions, including those in-
volving the different "national" segments of 
transnational corporations. 
There are three major North-South dis-
agreements still pending, however, related 
to (1) the legal form of the final international 
arrangement, (2) its implementation machine-
ry, and (3) the scope of restrictive practices in 
international technology transactions to be 
considered undesirable —in the language of 
the North, or to be banned— in that of the LDC 
technology importers. 
Let us take the first two points together, 
since they are closely linked. It is quite pos-
sible that the magnitude of the disagreement in 
respect of the legal form of the Code has been 
exaggerated by both the LDCs and the Western 
industrial countries, because from the be-
ginning both sides have divorced the issue of 
the legal form from that of the substantive 
content of the Code. The decisions adopted by 
UNCTAD IV to leave the legal aspects of the 
Code in abeyance for the time being represents 
general albeit somewhat belated recognition of 
the intimate relationship between the legal 
form and the content of the future international 
arrangement. Such recognition may pave the 
way for some sort of mutually acceptable 
solution of the legal issue at a hopefully final 
resumed session of the United Nations Confer-
ence on the Code in the fall of 1979. A 
compromise clearly depends upon agreement 
on the machinery for implementing the Code of 
Conduct: a subject to which not enough atten-
tion has been given at the earlier stages of the 
UNCTAD negotiations by both the LDCs and 
the Western industrial countries. 
According to the latest information from 
98 CEPAL REVIEW No. 10 / April 1980 
UNCTAD, some sort of compromise solution 
is in the making on this second important point, 
independent ly —it would appear— of the final 
decision on the Code's legal form. An inter-
governmental body is to be established within 
UNCTAD for the purpose of (1) providing a 
forum for discussion and exchange of views 
be tween States on matters related to the Code, 
in particular its application and the experience 
gained from its operation; (2) undertaking 
studies and research for the purpose of further-
ing the objectives of the Code; (3) inviting and 
considering relevant studies, documentation 
and reports from within the United Nations 
system; (4) studying, collecting and dissemi-
nating information on matters relating to the 
Code; (5) providing a forum for consultations 
be tween States, and (6) organizing meetings 
concerning the application of the provisions 
of the Code. 
Even though the terms of reference of 
such an intergovernmental body might state 
explicitly —as the Western industrial countries 
insist— that it could not act as a tribunal or 
reach conclusions on the conduct of individual 
governments or parties, the fact that considera-
tion is given also to periodical reviews of the 
application of the Code and its possible revi-
sion suggests strongly that, contrary to some 
interpretations, the potential role of the Code 
goes beyond that of just providing a favourable 
framework for the exercise by the States of 
their policy— and decision-making powers in 
the field of technology transfer. The future of 
the Code depends on its international imple-
mentation and not only on its legitimizing 
function in respect of national regulation. 
At least to this writer, the question of 
implementation is much more important than 
the legal issue for several very simple reasons. 
If one accepts that (1) a law by itself does not 
govern social relations unless it is supported 
by the power of potential sanctions, and (2) in 
the present technology transfer set-up im-
porters of technology (except in the case of the 
advanced countries of the West and of the 
East) have much less bargaining (and any 
other) power than technology producers and 
holders, then in the absence of sanctions not 
even a cast iron legally binding convention 
could help. Moreover, national legislation 
cannot secure the desired objectives either 
in the absence of some sort of bargaining parity. 
Thus, the issue of the legal form of the 
Code is subsidiary to that of its implementation 
machinery. The insistence by the LDCs on a 
legally binding code instead of mere guide-
lines is tantamount to an admission by the 
weaker parties that they are very weak indeed, 
so that they would like to see their weakness 
diminished by any means available, including 
the "sanctification" of the international regu-
lating instrument. 
It is the implementation of the Code 
which can make it into an international agree-
ment worth more than paper on which it is 
going to be written. Technology owners and 
sellers are well aware of the importance of that 
issue, and they hoped for the best of two possi-
ble worlds: voluntary guidelines with the 
implementation mechanism reduced to an 
informal forum for "observation" of the tech-
nology transfer practices. As one of the partici-
pants in the UNCTAD negotiations, repre-
senting a major Western power, stated publicly 
at an international academic conference on 
technology transfer controls, held at the 
Wharton School of the University of Philadel-
phia last February, the industrially advanced 
countries continue to consider unacceptable 
any "quasi-judiciary" international evaluation 
of such practices. 
The present writer expects a change in 
that position within the framework of a trade-
off between the issue of implementation 
machinery and the legal form of the agreement 
on technology transfer regulation. Only 
through such a trade-off can the negotiations 
result in some degree of international equal-
ization of technology transfer terms and condi-
tions, rather than just a framework for national 
regulatory action. Of course, no automatic 
power can be built into the Code at the present 
stage. Moreover, the Code may fall apart 
through cut-throat competition for technology 
transfer among the recipient countries, through 
the drift away from the industrial property 
system into secrecy by technology holders, or 
through other even less expected develop-
ments. After more than five years of negotia-
tions, however, the LDCs can at least feel that 
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an end will be put to exploitation without the 
participation of all the parties involved as far 
as most (albeit not all) international technology 
transactions are concerned. Whether the stage 
of "participation without exploitation" will 
ever be reached depends largely on the LDCs. 
V 
These considerations lead us to the third 
unresolved issue —that of the level of restric-
tive practices to be defined as undesirable 
and contrary to the interests of the LDC im-
porters of technology. 
The fact that restrictive business practices 
have increasingly become an important policy 
issue for governments and international 
agencies is the result of two clearly contradic-
tory trends: firstly, government policies (espe-
cially in major industrial countries) have, by 
encouraging and permitting the concentration 
of economic power at the national and inter-
national levels, inevitably facilitated the 
growth of power over the market and provided 
ample opportunities for the increased and 
effective use of restrictive business practices 
by private enterprises, and secondly, concur-
rently with the expanded use of such practices, 
particularly by transnational enterprises, it 
has become widely recognized that they affect 
the interests not only of the home countries of 
large enterprises but of other countries as well. 
While the subject of restrictive business 
practices is at present being dealt with in many 
places simultaneously, both inside and outside 
the United Nations, it is probable that the 
treatment it has received in the course of the 
UNCTAD negotiations on an international 
Code of Conduct on technology transfer offers 
better operative possibilities than in other 
forums, because nowhere outside the 
UNCTAD draft Code has an effort been made 
to specify and exemplify all the major restric-
tive practices currently in use in technology 
trade. At the same time, however, the progress 
achieved in that respect by the UNCTAD 
Code negotiators should not obscure by any 
means the size of the disagreement still 
existing between the developing world and 
the Western industrial countries. 
At the United Nations Conference on a 
Code of Conduct, agreement was reached by 
February 1979 on the provisions relating to 
exclusive dealing, exclusive sales or represen-
tation agreements, and payments and other 
obligations after the expiration of industrial 
property rights. Moreover, agreement has also 
been reached with respect to the criteria to be 
applied as regards including the notion of 
restraint of trade and adverse effects on the 
international flow of technology, particularly 
when restrictive practices hinder the economic 
and technological development of acquiring 
countries. Behind the unwillingness of the 
industrial countries to include in the list of 
restrictive practices six items that appear in 
the draft code elaborated by the Group of 77, 
however (limitations on volume and scope of 
production, use of quality controls, obligation 
to use trade marks, requirements to provide 
equity or participate in management, unlim-
ited or unduly long duration of arrangements, 
and limitations upon use of technology already 
imported), lies a series of major disagreements 
between the two main negotiating groups. 
According to an UNCTAD secretariat 
document, presented to UNCTAD V in Manila, 
which gives a review of major issues under 
negotiation in the field of the transfer of 
technology and the industrial property system, 
the following difficulties in respect of the 
chapter on restrictive practices in the draft 
Code still persist: 
(a) While fourteen restrictive business 
practices are agreed by all parties, including 
all the industrial countries, to be anti-competi-
tive in nature, the Group of 77 insists on the 
inclusion of the above six additional practices, 
independently of whether they are anti-com-
petitive or not, because they are regarded as 
being, for one reason or another, unfair to the 
acquiring party or as adversely affecting eco-
nomic and technological development in the 
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wider sense. Such is particularly the case as 
regards the obligation to use trade marks, 
which not only strengthens the monopoly 
patent but it directly responsible for creating 
outward-directed consumer preferences. 
(b) The question of the coverage and scope 
of the practices is far from settled. The indus-
trial countries would like to refer in the title of 
the chapter dealing with them just to "restric-
tive business practices", while the Group of 
77 explicitly suggests their regulation by 
proposing the general title "The regulation 
of practices and arrangements involving the 
transfer of technology". 
(c) The industrial countries continue to 
insist that it is necessary not only to enumerate 
restrictive practices but to determine whether 
their effect is actually harmful in practice. 
Consequently, they want to introduce in this, 
as in other fields covered by the Code, the 
notion of the "rule of reason" or "public 
interest". The Group of 77, however, objects 
to the inclusion of such a concept in the 
definition of the practices, on the grounds that 
the application of the "rule of reason" gives rise 
to a real danger of arbitrary interpretation of 
restrictive practices by the parties responsible 
for originating such practices, be they private 
parties or their governments. 
(d) Finally, on the grounds of "unequal 
partnership", the Group of 77 defends the 
right of the competent authorities of the tech-
nology-acquiring country to disregard, in ex-
ceptional circumstances, the restrictive prac-
tices proscribed by the Code, provided that on 
balance and on development grounds there 
will be no adverse effect on its national econo-
my. Industrial countries do not accept such 
an exception clause in the Code. 
In brief, while the shape of the treatment 
which the issue of restrictive business prac-
tices will receive in the UNCTAD Code is 
slowly emerging, the process of international 
negotiation has been protracted and difficult. 
Indeed, perhaps it would never have reached 
such a detailed level in the absence of the 
expertise available within the Group of 77 as 
the consequence of the recent introduction 
in many LDCs of restrictive business practices 
legislation. Such new legislation has arisen 
mostly from the double concern, first, about 
the structure of economic power in itself, 
resulting from historical developments and 
economic dependence on the advanced indus-
trial economies, and, second, about the ability 
of mostly foreign enterprises with dominant 
power to use it to the detriment of the broadly 
defined national interest, through overpricing 
goods and technology and controlling the 
manufacture and distribution of products. It 
is no accident that these concerns found their 
reflection in the most detailed ever presenta-
tion of 40 restrictive practices in the early 
draft Code, elaborated by the Group of 77. 
The reduction of this original list to 20 
practices between 1975 and 1978 should not 
be understood as an admission by the Group of 
77 of the irrelevance of half the actual practices 
detected by its experts. On the contrary, for 
the sake of arriving at a mutually agreeable 
consensus the "missing" twenty were incor-
porated in the shorter basic list or transferred 
in new legal language to other parts of the draft 
Code. 
Just as in the case of national legislation 
on restrictive business practices, it would be 
unrealistic and naïve to assume that any sort of 
international regulation of such practices, 
including that which may emerge from the 
UNCTAD Code on the transfer of technology 
once it is adopted, can by itself take care of the 
concentration of economic power and its en-
croachment on the development process in 
LDCs. It must be stressed that international 
regulation of restrictive business practices 
will fail unless the individual countries (1) set 
up their own development strategies, (2) de-
sign and implement policies aimed at in-
creasing their domestic economic and tech-
nological capability and (3) introduce national 
legislation against restrictive business prac-
tices —defined more broadly than is the case 
in the similar legislation in force in the indus-
trial countries or their groupings such as the 
European Economic Community.4 
4UNCTAD, Control of Restrictive Business Practices 
in the European Economic Community, Report by the 
UNCTAD Secretariat, TD/B/608, Geneva, 1977. 
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VI 
These three major unresolved issues are 
closely related to the North-South divergence 
of views on the role of private interests in the 
international technology transfer process. The 
present official position of the Western in-
dustrial countries is based on the belief that 
private investment and investment-related 
activities, such as licensing and service and 
management contracts, among others, repre-
sent the most effective method for the inter-
national transfer of technology. This assump-
tion gives rise to their advocacy of a liberal 
investment policy with a minimum of govern-
ment intervention at both ends of the tech-
nology transfer process, i.e., in the selling and 
buying countries, accompanied by insistence 
on the maintenance of what has traditionally 
been called a sound and predictable invest-
ment climate. 
These beliefs are not shared by most 
LDCs, even including those countries that 
follow quite liberal policies vis-à-vis foreign 
investment. The LDCs do not deny that a very 
large part of the presently available technology 
is privately owned, and they accept the right 
of its owners to reasonable retribution, but 
most of them take the view that excessive 
emphasis on the role of private investment as 
the bearer of technological progress either 
originates from the intention to defend par-
ticular interests of technology exporters or 
reflects confusion as regards the basic issue of 
technological development and technology 
transfer to the LDCs. According to the LDCs, 
technological progress and technology trade 
cannot be considered at the international level 
merely as a set of private transactions. 
While most people in the industrial West 
equate technology transfer with the diffusion 
of privately-held know-how, the LDCs believe 
that real technology transfer takes place only 
when the know-how is incorporated into the 
stock of available knowledge in such a way that 
the receiving society can use it for varied 
purposes. One of these purposes —perhaps the 
most important for the LDCs— is that of 
bui lding up their own more or less autonomous 
technological capacity so as to permit them to 
decide about the importation of the know-how, 
its adaptation to local conditions and its uses 
for broad societal objectives. 
If local technological capability is not 
understood only the very limited sense of the 
capability of the private industrial sector, and 
if technology transfer is understood not as the 
diffusion of private know-how within indi-
vidual firms but as a social process, then it is 
difficult to defend the position that a single 
channel , such as foreign private investment 
—more and more equated these days with 
transnational corporations— represents the 
only, the best and the most expeditious transfer 
mechanism. There is ample evidence, both in 
the developed and the developing countries, 
that the spill-over of the know-how diffused 
within an enterprise, large or small, is very 
limited because of the proprietary character 
of such know-how and the owner's legitimate 
interest in keeping it to himself for competitive 
reasons. If this is so, such transfers are not 
sufficient for a developing country, even if 
regulated. Other transfers through other 
mechanisms are clearly needed to amplify the 
range of the scientific and technical knowledge 
available to society as a whole, including that 
available to the State and the educational 
system. 
A variety of transfer mechanisms is also 
needed, in the context of underdevelopment, 
for another important purpose: in the LDCs 
the technological capability of the State and of 
the higher education system are needed to 
assure social uses of private knowledge. This 
problem does not arise in the advanced coun-
tries because they count upon the scientific 
and technological equilibrium among the 
major segments of society which has been 
established gradually over the last 100 years. 
The situation is very different in the under-
developed world, however, which is backward 
because, among other reasons, it does not have 
at its disposal the necessary minimum overall 
scientific and technical capability. That capa-
bility must be build up by the domestic effort, 
with the support of imports of know-how (i.e., 
technology transfers) —support which is hardly 
automatic and should be subject to both inter-
national and national regulations. 
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VII 
There are two very important political factors 
that work in favour of the elaboration and 
international acceptance of some sort of Code 
of Conduct, hopefully by 1980. At the present 
moment, technology transfer regulation is the 
only concrete point on the large agenda of 
North-South economic issues on which both 
the LDCs and the West have been able to 
proceed from the stage of general debate and 
mutual recriminations to that of working to-
gether on technical and operational proposals. 
Since clearly nobody wants to go back to 
violent political confrontations, the common 
interest in pursuing negotiations on inter-
national technology transfer regulation —if 
only to prove that a dialogue between the de-
veloped and developing countries is possi-
ble— may prevail over those circles in the 
major industrial countries, and particularly 
in the United States, who —taking a narrower 
short-term view— would have nothing against 
making out of these UNCTAD negotiations 
another United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea. 
The second important factor militating in 
favour of a compromise solution on the subject 
of the Code is that in its prolonged absense 
there would be an increased risk of some 
LDCs starting to devise unilaterally restrictive 
national regulatory systems that might nega-
tively affect international technology exports. 
Under such conditions many people in the 
industrial technology-exporting West feel that 
reasonable international technology trade 
regulation might be better —much better as a 
matter of fact— than a maze of restrictive 
national schemes. If adopted without undue 
delay, such international regulation may offer 
basic standards in many LDCs for similar 
domestic schemes that would take into equi-
table consideration the interests of all the 
parties concerned. 
A question that seems to linger still in 
many minds in the Western industrial coun-
tries is —what is the need for international 
action if the problems of international tech-
nology trade could be taken care by national 
regulation? In the light of the evidence avail-
able the answer seems quite simple. The is-
sues involved are too big, too important and 
too complicated to be treated exclusively at 
the national level at a time when the North is 
talking about interdependence and the South 
is stressing the need for a new international 
economic order. Technology, its development 
and its transfer are a worldwide problem and 
must be considered as such. Not only is a set 
of mutually acceptable rules urgently needed 
for the only remaining part of world trade not 
subject to any multilateral agreement, but the 
whole exercise also has a tremendous educa-
tional value for the developed, developing 
and socialist countries. It is helping all of them 
not only to design the general rules for tech-
nology transactions but also to define the 
preconditions for socially useful technology 
transfers and to clarify the crucial issue of the 
contribution of technology to development. 
